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Main News
UN minutes from final Crans-Montana dinner leaked
Phileleftheros, Politis
Negotiations Process
OVERVIEW
Politis and Phileleftheros, in their main news item, reveal and report on the same top-secret UN minutes taken during the final dinner during which the Crans-Montana round of negotiations collapsed.
The almost four-hour dinner had taken place on July 6, 2017 and had begun at 9:15pm. Politis reports that it has gotten hold of the 11 pages of UN minutes taken during the dinner, containing 47 paragraphs outlining the main points of discussion.
The papersreport that the dinner began with the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres believing that there was agreement on almost all points of his Framework, or at least that the two sides were close to agreeing.
The paper reports that Guterres knew through bilateral meetings already held that the chapter involving guarantees and troops would be difficult, but he hoped that during the dinner he would able to close all other open issues so that he could then call a meeting at the level of Prime Ministers to discuss the issue of the withdrawal of troops. But, the paper adds, Guterres knew through the 15-minute meetings he held with the two leaders prior to the dinner that consent on all matters would be a difficult feat.
Opening the dinner, Politis reports that Guterres had told parties that it was time to move to a packaging approach around six issues: territory, power-sharing, property, the right of Turkish citizens, guarantees, and foreign troops.
Guterres then outlined the state of play on each issue. Regarding territory, he said the GC side proposed the Annan Plan map, while the TCs proposed the map they had tabled on January 11 in Geneva, but with the adjustment of Morphou as an additional element.
Regarding governance and power-sharing, Guterres said the sides were “practically in full agreement”. There would by a system of rotating presidency on a 2:1 basis. On the issue of Turkish nationals, Guterres said there was disagreement regarding the number that would be permitted to permanently reside in Cyprus post-solution, with the GC side proposing a ration of 4:1 (one Turk for every four Greeks), while the TC side insisted on a ration of 1:1.
Regarding property, Guterres said there was a general agreement on philosophy, with solutions in the future TC constituent state favouring current users and solutions in territorially readjusted areas favouring dispossessed owners, but issues still remained in relation to the ECHR decision and matters relating to the emotional attachment of GCs to property that would remain under TC administration.
Regarding guarantees, Guterres said it would be difficult to maintain the Treaty of Guarantee and the unilateral right of intervention contained within it, but took note of Turkey’s position that the Treaty should be maintained. Guterres then pointed to the non-paper submitted by Turkey for the replacement of the Treaty of Guarantee with a Treaty of Implementation. Guterres asked Cavusoglu if Turkey would consider stripping the Treaty of Guarantee immediately if it was replaced with a credible monitoring mechanism, with Cavusoglu responding that Turkey was open to dialogue as long as progress is made on the four other domestic issues.
Guterres also said the GC side tabled a proposal for an implementation mechanism, adding that he himself had prepared a non-paper, describing an implementation monitoring mechanism in which the UN and he personally would play an important role.
On troops, Guterres said the GC side’s position of ‘zero troops, zero guarantees’ was a red line for Turkey, while the position of Turkey and the TC side that Turkish military presence should remain was a red line for the GC side. He said he did not see prospect for further movement on this from either side and concluded that this was a discussion that needed to be held at a higher level (between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey). Guterres gave the parties two options: either the PMs would convene in New York in the coming days or they would come to Crans-Montana in the next few days to overcome the deadlock.
The floor was then opened for comments. Former Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias said he rejected Turkey’s idea for a Treaty of Implementation, but was open to discussing the implementation monitoring mechanism, only if this was intended as a replacement for the Treaty of Guarantee, not as a mere supplement to it. But he also said the mechanism (UNSG’s non-paper) was overly complicated and said the role of current guarantors would have to be defined, adding that he would not consider any role other than observation.
Regarding troops, Kotzias said a distinction needed to be made between those troops that arrived in 1974 and the 650 foreseen under the Treaty of Alliance. He said the first category would be expected to leave immediately and so would the second, though perhaps not immediately and through a different withdrawal methodology.
Former UK Minister for European Neighbourhood Sir Alan Duncan took Kotzias’ statement as wasting the historic opportunity that was before them. He called on the parties to focus on the achievements made on the big issues, such as guarantees and the scrapping of the unilateral right of intervention, and then focus on the implementation and monitoring mechanism.
On his part, Cavusoglu said the UNSG’s statement whereby the unilateral right of intervention was not sustainable was well noted, as was his statement that troops might stay. He reiterated that ‘zero troops zero guarantees’ was a non-starter for Turkey but said Turkey had tried to be flexible on some issues and had shared proposals with the UNSG on both the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. He also said the unilateral right of intervention could be reviewed subject to agreement on other issues, noting that further progress on other issues would see Turkey become even more flexible.
He also said he did not trust that that his proposals would remain confidential, adding that the leaking of Turkey’s proposals by the GCs made him hesitant, and this was acknowledged by the UNSG. Cavusoglu also said that the conference was not only about security and guarantees, since there were still some outstanding issues in the five chapters, and asked the leaders whether they thought they would be able to resolve them. He added that though Turkey had shown flexibility on the Treaty of Guarantee, the GC side and Greece were insisting that all troops be withdrawn. He said Turkey had invested a lot in the process, and that the Turkish PM would only come if progress was made towards a comprehensive settlement.
President Nicos Anastasiades said he had not been afraid to put his proposals in writing, and asked why the GC side did not know Turkey’s proposals. He asked how he could know if the Treaty of Guarantee and the right to intervention would indeed be abolished, and said he needed to know what Cavusoglu meant by ‘flexibility’, as well as the role of guarantors in the monitoring mechanism. He asked how he could be sure that the proposal being tabled was not just the Treaty of Guarantee under a different name.
Anastasiades also said that the security of one community should not come at the expense of the security of the other community, noting that the presence of Turkish troops was a threat to the GCs. He then asked whether the other side would accept Russian guarantees.
He also deplored the absence of moves from Turkey to meet the GC’s concerns and insisted he needed clarity and to see the proposals in writing. He said that security was the top priority and if there was no solution in security and guarantees, there would be no solution, including in the other chapters.
Cavusoglu responded that Turkey had already shared its proposal, but Anastasiades said it had not shared it with him, to which Cavusoglu said the parties had made a deal to not disclose each other’s proposals and yet, Turkey’s paper had been leaked. He also said the GC side had included a reference to ‘rejecting the notion of rotating presidency’ in the leaked version, adding that he could not trust Anastasiades. Anastasiades interjected saying that the best way to change the demographics of an area was the ‘peaceful’ way, reminding that TCs wanted to establish ceilings for the GC’s right to acquire property, asking what about Turkish citizens buying property in Cyprus? Anastasiades then asked the UNSG what the plan was now if there was nothing concrete to agree on.
On his part, former TC leader Mustafa Akinci said that the sides had solved many issues but had not been able to solve some others, reminding that security and guarantees had not been tackled before. He said this was the first time Turkey had agreed to address the issues and this constituted “a major step”. He said he was not sure what kind of signal was still expected from Turkey. With regards to troops, Turkey had indicated readiness for an early, significant reduction, he said.
Akinci said the two sides were not at the same level of urgency, pointing to the significance of solving the problem and not missing the opportunity. He said it was possible for the sides to agree on a package on the six issues identified by the UNSG and set a date for the referenda. They could then return to Cyprus to make the necessary preparations. Akinci urged Anastasiades to “make a last attempt”, adding that if they failed to do it, they would be accountable to their people. He said the last chance for a federation is before them and that the road forward is one of more cooperation and trust and fewer troops.
The conversation then continued with Anastasiades reiterating that Turkey’s proposals were not clear, with both Cavusoglu and Guterres reassuring him that Turkey could abandon its intervention rights and that the monitoring mechanism submitted by Guterres left the guarantor powers with no executive authority and that it was not a Treaty of Guarantee in all but name, as Anastasiades had previously stated. The conversation then derailed due to lack of trust, with the process collapsing.
Politis, in its evaluation of the minutes, reports that Turkey’s stance of not submitting its proposals on guarantes in writing was clearly unacceptable and frustrating, but the UNSG had thought Cavusoglu’s non-paper as credible and insisted that the conversation could continue.
The paper writes that Anastasiades did not show any trust to Guterres and so showed little flexibility in the final negotiations, insisting on the abolition of guarantees and the simultaneous withdrawal of troops. Politis also reports that it is clear that Anastasiades wanted to terminate the conference, with the paper identifying him as annoyed and Kotzias as lacking a diplomatic willingness.
The paper writes that both had gone to the conference knowing that Turkey would never accept this position. It also asks: what was more important, when the 650-1,000 troops (from the current 30,000-40,000) would leave, or to abolish Turkey’s intervention rights? Given Anastasiades’ unconstructive stance, the paper reports that he had the biggest responsibility for the collapse of the dinner.
Phileleftheros, however, argues that it was Cavusoglu that blew up the process, with his real intentions becoming clear as the dinner was heading to a collapse. It writes that despite the UNSG’s attempt to present Turkey as having made a serious concession as regards guarantees while keeping Greece and the GC side in a general state of ambiguity so that the PMs could fly in hoping that they would accept Turkey’s proposal, Turkey was only willing to have guarantees re-examined within 15 years’ time. It argues that Turkey in fact never accepted a withdrawal of its troops, nor did they agree to the abolition of its intervention rights and guarantees.